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CENTRAL

DATA JUN 1980 REVIEWERS

INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 December 1959

# DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: Recently available evidence indicates that strikes or similar disorders took place this fall in the vicinity of the Karaganda metallurgical plant in north-central Kazakhstan. Such disturbances are very seldom noted in the USSR, and while they do not constitute a threat to the stability of the regime in Moscow or even to the control of local authorities, they are symptomatic of the chronic troubles Moscow constantly faces in the minority republics. In this instance poor living conditions and resentment of new work norms apparently touched off the incidents; two reports allege that troops were called in. The situation was serious enough to prompt Moscow to send out one of its high-level inspectors from the party central committee, and three top officials in Karaganda Oblast were fired. The recent replacement of the Kazakh chiefs of both State Security (KGB) and Internal Affairs (MVD) may have some connection with the disturbances. (Map)

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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
DAILY BRIEF

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#### LATE ITEM

\*Brazil: Some 20 rebellious air force officers commandeered five planes on 3 December and set up a "revolutionary base" at inland Aragarcas about 1,100 miles northwest of Rio de Janeiro. This surprise maneuver seems designed primarily to support dramatically the reinstatement of Janio Quadros as the presidential candidate of the principal opposition party and several smaller parties whose bickering prompted Quadros' tentative resignation. Thus far no further military support for the rebels is evident. A similar miniature rebellion by air force officers fizzled in 1956. The air minister considers the incident serious but controllable by counter operations to begin on 4 December.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### Strikes in Kazakhstan

Accumulating evidence indicates that strikes or similar disorders took place this fall in the area near Temir Tau in north-central Kazakhstan where the large Karaganda metal-lurgical plant is being built. According to the most recent report, a Kazakh student who returned to Moscow from Kazakhstan at the end of September stated that protests against poor living conditions and new work norms by workers in Temir Tau in early September developed into a civil disturbance which required army intervention. There had been unconfirmed reports and rumors earlier which referred to work stoppages and unrest in the same area. One report alleged that several miners were killed by the police in quelling a strike in September.


Moscow was sufficiently concerned to send out one of its high-level inspectors from the party central committee. The party committee of Karaganda Oblast met on 21 October and the central committee in Kazakh Republic on 24 October to discuss the situation. The criticism, led at both meetings by republic party First Secretary Nikolay Belyayev, focused on the "intolerable indifference" to the "vital needs" of the construction workers at the metallurgical plant. The first secretary and another secretary of the Karaganda Oblast party organization and the chairman of the Karaganda Sovnarkhoz were fired.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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# Agreement Reported on Mali Independence Arrangements

French President de Gaulle and leaders of the Mali Federation--composed of the autonomous French Community states of Senegal and Soudan--agreed in principle last week during talks initiated by De Gaulle that, effective next June, Mali should become independent with special contractual ties with France, according to Mali Assembly President Senghor. Senghor, who participated in the talks along with Mali President Keita and Vice President Dia, respectively the premiers of Soudan and Senegal, told the American consul general in Dakar on 30 November that French sponsorship of Mali's UN candidacy would follow.

According to Senghor, De Gaulle agreed to Mali's plan to achieve independence through a negotiated transfer of "common" powers actually wielded by Paris, but insisted that special agreements providing for cooperation in such fields as defense, foreign affairs, education, and economic aid be worked out beforehand and come into force on the date of independence. On the basis of such arrangements—designed basically to assure Mali's post-independence political and strategic solidarity with France—De Gaulle is apparently prepared to accept Mali as a continuing member of the French-subsidized Community. The alternative with which Mali's representatives were presumably confronted was Mali's complete departure from the Community.

Concessions by the three leaders to De Gaulle's insistence that there be no time gap between the transfer of powers and the effective date of the association agreements will be sharply criticized by more militant Mali elements which are particularly strong within the governing party of Soudan. These elements have long favored a complete break with the Community and will exploit any future difficulties between French and Mali representatives.

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# III. THE WEST

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New French Proposal on Mediterranean Fleet Cooperation With NATO

A new French proposal concerning employment of the Mediterranean fleet in wartime would have the Mediterranean-Algeria-Sahara command under General Challe authorize the fleet to undertake certain limited NATO functions on a second-priority basis. Coordination would be effected directly between the French Navy and US and UK naval force commanders in the Mediterranean, rather than through the NATO Mediterranean commander, CINCFMED. The French proposal, revealed to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is to be presented to the NATO Standing Group. According to SACEUR, the plan's subordination of NATO to French national responsibilities has led even some responsible French military officers to describe it as "obviously unacceptable."

The proposal seems in line with De Gaulle's reiterated belief that NATO planning has been too narrowly focused on the concept of an East-West struggle, and has ignored the danger that Europe may be outflanked by the Soviet bloc through Africa, a development which France claims it is seeking to prevent through its effort to maintain control over Algeria and the Sahara.

De Gaulle may also view continued withholding of the fleet from full wartime cooperation with NATO as a means of stressing his demands for a greater French voice in NATO and for French participation on an equal basis with the US and UK in global policy and strategy coordination.

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